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A JUDGE'S ETHICAL DILEMMA: ASSESSING
A CHILD'S CAPACITY TO CHOOSE
Wallace J. Mlyniec*
INTRODUCTION
C ASES involving children's lives differ from other cases coming
before a judge. When adjudicating disputes between adults,
judges apply legal principles to past events in an effort to resolve dis-
agreements or assess responsibility. While resolving the dispute may
affect litigants' futures financially, it seldom involves the very nature
of the litigants' lives.'
When making decisions concerning a child, judges consider prior
events and legal principles in order to make predictions about a child's
future. Judges determine where children will live, with whom they
will live, how they will live, and what will be done to, by, or for them.
The legal principles judges use to decide cases about children are
often vague. Commentators view the "best interest of the child" stan-
dard, which purports to guide decision making in all children's cases,
as imprecise at best, and have criticized it for years.' "Proper care and
rehabilitation," the standard used in delinquency cases, also presents
similar uncertainties, and has historically lent itself to political or cul-
tural choices that correlate weakly with a child's well-being.3 More-
over, research concerning child development suggests that concepts
like "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary"-while somewhat immuta-
ble when applied to the adult reasoning process-is fluid prior to
* Wallace J. Mlyniec, Professor of Law, Associate Dean, and Director of the
Juvenile Justice Clinic, Georgetown University Law School.
The author wishes to thank Jennifer Matthews, Carol Benjamin, and Chris
Longmore for their research assistance, Wanda Duarte for her technical assistance,
and Judge Stephen Milliken of the District of Columbia Superior Court for his helpful
comments during the preparation of this Article.
1. Even in criminal cases, where the impact on defendants' lives is greater than
those on the lives of civil litigants, the results do not affect defendants in the same way
that court proceedings affect children. While conditions of probation and periods of
confinement may drastically affect how a person lives his or her life, criminal proceed-
ings aim primarily to punish violators for past deeds, not, as is in children's cases, to
create an environment where growth is to be fostered.
2. See generally David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Cus-
tody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477, 480-86 (1984) (criticizing the stan-
dard); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226,262-72 (Summer 1975) (same).
3. See David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and its Al-
ternatives in Progressive America 268-89 (1980) (reviewing the poor treatment chil-
dren received in the early juvenile court); Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec,
Whatever Happened to the Right to Treatment?: The Modern Quest for an Historical
Promise, 69 Temp. L.Q. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 5, on file with the Ford-




adulthood. Such malleability makes these concepts difficult to apply
uniformly in all cases concerning children. Similarly, the "mature mi-
nor" concept and the doctrine of "informed consent," standards used
in cases involving medical decisions, involve equally fluid
determinations.
Nonetheless, judges use these concepts daily when making place-
ment and treatment decisions concerning children, and when assessing
the validity of waivers and assertions of rights by children. They rely
on these concepts in a variety of cases including divorce and custody,
adoption, neglect and abuse, medical and mental health treatment,
abortion, delinquency, and status offenses. When judges make deci-
sions, we as a society expect the judges to do so ethically. Ethical
decision making, in this context, means deciding cases not on the basis
of personal experience, societal beliefs, or personal assessments about
"how things should be," but on the facts presented in court, the law as
it has developed, and on scientific rather than conventional wisdom
regarding life around us.4 The complexity of children's cases, the im-
precision of the available standards, the process by which cases are
adjudicated, and the unpredictability of future events make decision
making by judges very difficult. The accumulated and ever changing
knowledge of science and the impact of societal changes on childhood
and adolescence compound the difficulty, as does the simple need for
efficiency in modem court systems. Notwithstanding this complexity,
judges must strive in each case to provide justice.
Children affected in these cases often-express strong preferences for
a course of action, and possess equally strong opinions about the cor-
rectness of a judge's rejection of their choice. Such preferences and
opinions may undermine the enforceability of the court order. Chil-
dren may "know" the parent with whom they wish to live or whether
or not they want to leave their parents' home and establish new ties
with foster or adoptive parents. They may "know" whether or not
they want mental health treatment or to be placed in a residential
facility. They may "know" whether they want to be an organ donor or
cease painful but life preserving medical treatment. They may
"know" whether they want an abortion. They may "know" their
rights in the delinquency context. Many biological, psychosocial, ex-
periential, and contextual factors influence their preferences and ac-
tions in these cases. In a given case, the existence of such
"knowledge" and the strength of the preference are seldom matters of
the child's credibility as lawyers and judges usually understand the
term credibility during the litigation process. Judges who reject the
child's preference do so because they conclude, validly or invalidly,
that the child's biological, psychosocial, and educational development
4. See Byron F. Lindsley, Ruling Without Bias, 24 Judge's J. 19 (Winter 1985)




renders him incapable of truly rational thought or subject to influ-
ences that render his rational judgment unsound. Other social con-
cerns, like proper law enforcement and public safety in delinquency
cases, or child protection in health cases or cases of abuse or neglect,
may also provide a judge with countervailing reasons to discount the
child's assessment of his needs.
Judges assume their decisions are rational, and want their orders
obeyed. They know, however, that enforcing orders that conflict with
a child's desires is difficult. For example, older children may just run
away from the home or hospital in which the judge places them.
When judges refuse to permit abortions without parental consent or
notification, children may simply travel to another state or lie about
their ages. Children may physically resist treatment efforts. Knowing
that an order may be ignored also affects the judge's decision.
Judges also consider the tension that exists between Western cul-
tural beliefs concerning personal and political autonomy and Western
cultural traditions regarding the immaturity and incapacity of chil-
dren. Judges may also generally be aware of the growing body of
knowledge concerning child development that calls into question sev-
eral societal assumptions about children. Unlike policymakers or
medical researchers, however, judges need not consider a child's polit-
ical autonomy. If the case is in court, the legislature has already re-
solved the political autonomy issues against children, and has decided
that children may not control their own lives. Despite the tangential
focus given to political autonomy in judicial proceedings, judges none-
theless must weigh valid scientific information concerning child devel-
opment in relation to cultural beliefs. In addition, to render ethical
decisions concerning the mental capacity and intellectual development
of the individual child for whom justice is sought in their courtrooms,
judges must necessarily respect that child's personal autonomy.
This Article will explore what child development research offers to
judges who seek to make ethical decisions concerning children's lives.
Part I surveys some of the child development literature. Part II seeks
to determine how judges actually apply the law in relation to chil-
dren's preferences and choices in various legal contexts. Part III sug-
gests a guide for ethical decision making that reflects the research of
child development theorists and incorporates the personal autonomy
of children-while recognizing some cultural norms regarding chil-
dren's incapacity.
I. CHILD DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND CHILDREN'S DECISION-
MAKING CAPACITY
This part reviews child development theory and, in particular, how
research in this area has viewed children's decision-making capacity.
The first subpart offers-a brief survey of how societies have historically
distinguished between childhood and adulthood. The second subpart
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summarizes Piaget's Cognitive Development Theory, and examines
some of the schools of thought that have adapted as well as rejected
the Piagetian framework. This part concludes with an exploration of
current perspectives on children's decision-making capacity in the
child development literature, adolescent behavioral traits, and
learning.
A. Survey of Historical Demarcations Between Childhood and
Adulthood
The laws and cultural mores of most societies generally have recog-
nized distinctions between children and adults. 5 In eras when commu-
nities seldom kept birth records, members marked distinctions
between children and adults most often by changes in physical fea-
tures or in physical ability.6 Various societies have signified the onset
of puberty as the attainment of a status different from that of child-
hood.7 Spiritual awakening or a change in obligations to the society
often occurred at that time. Some early civilizations relied on age as a
point of demarcation between childhood and adulthood. The Ro-
mans, for example, presumed that a person understood the law as of
age fourteen.8 Christian and Jewish traditions, as well as those of
other societies, accorded a child responsibilities to the community
around age thirteen.9 At least since the sixteenth century, the English
have accepted, age as a useful, albeit imprecise, indicator of those de-
marcations. Anglo-Saxon law did not hold children responsible for
their criminal acts before the age of seven, but held children totally
responsible after the age of fourteen. 10 For children between the ages
of seven and fourteen, courts adopted a rebuttable presumption that
they possess an adult capacity to do evil. In the United States today,juvenile delinquency codes retain this respite from the harshness of
the criminal code. While the criminal law made such variable distinc-
5. Cultural historians disagree about the emergence of childhood as a distinct
period in human development and about whether childhood was a grim period in a
person's life or a period of affectionate attachment, prior to the twentieth century. See
Roger J.R. Levesque, The Internationalization of Children's Human Rights: Too Rad-
ical for American Adolescents?, 9 Conn. J. Int'l L. 237, 243-52 (1994) (citing sources
such as E. McCoy, Childhood Through the Ages, 88/89 Sociology 44-47 (Kurt Fm-
sterbusch ed., 1988) and Lloyd de Mause, The History of Childhood 51-54 (1974)).
6. A persons ability to carry the weight of armor has been suggested as a reason
why the age of majority moved from 15 to 21 between the 11th and 13th century. See
Comm. on Child Psychiatry, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, How Old Is
Old Enough?: The Ages of Rights & Responsibilities 7-8 (1989) [hereinafter Group
for the Advancement of Psychiatry].
7. Id. at 9, 10.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id at 10.
10. 1 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 463-64 (George Shar-
swood ed., 1871) (stating that "[ijn criminal cases an infant of the age of fourteen
years may be capitally punished for any capital offence... but under the age of seven
he cannot" (emphasis omitted)).
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tions, the civil law in England and in early America established the
age of legal adulthood at twenty-one.'
To say that adolescence 12 and even childhood 1 3 constitute rather
new concepts, or that children in prior centuries performed many
adult tasks at an early age, does not refute the fact that, for the last
five hundred years, Anglo-American societies have held children le-
gally subject to the authority of parent or master until the age of
twenty-one.' 4 In most situations today, the law recognizes rigid de-
marcations between adulthood and childhood based on age. The age
at which a child legally becomes an adult may vary from fourteen to
twenty-one for a particular event. Thus, state laws permit drinking,
driving, marrying, voting, and working at different ages. Legislatures
base these laws on the assumption that those persons on the childhood
side of the demarcation cannot understand or perform these particular
tasks.' 5
11. While the law vested some decision making in a child at an earlier age, full
power vested at 21. Id. at 452 (stating that "[t]he legal power of a father.., over the
persons of his children ceases at the age of twenty-one").
12. Most commentators credit G. Stanley Hall as the first scholar to establish ado-
lescence as a field of study. See G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence (Lawrence A. Cremin
ed., Arno Press and The New York Times 1969) (1905).
13. Many societies did not consider children a special class of people until the
eighteenth century. See Levesque, supra note 5, at 246.
14. Historians debate the degree of freedom possessed by "adolescents" in prior
eras. Some scholars like Janet Ainsworth, relying in part on the work of Phillipe
Aries, believe that the life-styles of young people prior to the twentieth century
demonstrate that they participated as fully integrated members of the community. See
Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083, 1093 (1991). Others
look at the data of preindustrialized societies and see that, as a matter of law, parents
or other adults (to whom children were bound out as apprentices or common labor-
ers) regulated the activities of young people. Laurence Steinberg, Developmental
Considerations in Youth Advocacy, in Who Speaks for the Children?: The Handbook
for Individual and Class Child Advocacy 23, 25-29 (Jack C. Westman ed., 1991); see
also Blackstone, supra note 10, at 463-66 (discnssing the rights of persons under the
age of 21).
15. Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning children makes this clear. In Gins-
berg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), Justice Stewart explained that "a chid ... is
not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice .... It is only upon such a
premise ... that a State may deprive children of... rights." Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836 n.43 (1988) ("The
difference that separates children from adults for most purposes of the law is chil-
dren's immature, undeveloped ability to reason in an adultlike manner." (quoting
Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Juveniles 3-20, 184-89 (1987))). This notion of
immaturity can be perceived in most if not all Supreme Court cases concerning chil-
dren's rights. See Katherine Hunt Federle, On The Road to Reconceiving Rights for
Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983,




B. Overview of Child Development Theory
In the past, societies deduced distinctions between adults and chil-
dren from human experience and observation. In modem times, the
research of child development theorists has validated such distinc-
tions, despite the fact that many theories of child development have
gained and lost prominence over the years. Stage theory, social learn-
ing theory, Freudian psychology, behavioralism, humanism, and eco-
logical theory all have added to a modern understanding of the
differences and similarities between the cognitive abilities of adults
and children. Researchers subscribing to these theories have added to
our understanding of how children learn and how their capabilities
develop.' 6 R. Murray Thomas has synthesized the various theories
and offers four principles that guide modem thinking about children's
development. According to Thomas:
(1) genetic endowment defines a range of potential intellectual abil-
ity within which environmental influences can operate to produce
the actual intellectual skills people display in their lives, (2) such
genetic endowment can differ from one person to another, so that
one individual's potential will differ from another's, (3) the flower-
ing of genetic potential evolves gradually over the first two decades
of life, and (4) the maturation, of this flowering can differ from one
person to another.17
Modern thinking about child development has evolved over time.
The following subpart reviews the development theory of Piaget and
considers, in particular, how he viewed children's decision-making ca-
pacity in light of cognitive function, behavior, and learning.
1. Piagetian Cognitive Development Theory
Jean Piaget has emerged as perhaps the most influential researcher
in the area of child development. Working over a period of many
years, Piaget observed children and developed the theory that knowl-
edge develops continually from a state of lesser knowledge to one that
is more complete and effective.' Calling his system stage theory or
cognitive theory, Piaget believed that all people possess certain inter-
nal motivation points (the stages) at which learning occurs.' 9 Piaget
further theorized that physically experiencing an object (self learning)
16. See generally R. Murray Thomas, Comparing Theories of Child Development(3d ed. 1992) (providing a comparative analysis of various child development
theories).
17. Id. at 519.
18. Jean Piaget, Psychology and Epistemology 5-7 (Arnold Rosin trans., 1971).
Piaget wrote many books in his lifetime. Throughout this section, this Article will be
drawing on the synthesis of Piaget's work found in Thomas. See Thomas, supra note
16, at 273-318.
19. Piaget, supra note 18, at 44-51.
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and social transmission (education) influence these motivation
points.2°
Piaget posited four basic levels of development. Level One, called
the sensory motor period, occurs from birth to two years old. During
this period, children move from reflexive and adaptive actions
through experimentation, and begin to demonstrate some mentally in-
ventive acts of intelligence. At the end of this stage, children can
mentally plan simple physical tasks using objects in view.2 ' David
Elkind describes the main task of children at this level as the "con-
quest of the object."'22 Level Two, called the preoperational thought
period, occurs between two and seven years of age. Passing through
two substages, at this level children gain a facility for language and
move from simple problem solving, based on what they hear and see
directly, to incipient logical thought. Nonetheless, direct perception,
rather than logical thought and governing principles, primarily influ-
ence this intuitive thinking. Thus, according to Piaget, children under
the age of seven cannot engage in truly intellectual activity.
23 Elkind
describes the main task of children at this level as the "conquest of the
symbol."24 Level Three, called the concrete operations period, occurs
between seven and eleven years of age. During this period, children
begin to understand causation, gain a more objective view of the uni-
verse, and attain a better understanding of others' perceptions. Dur-
ing this period, children begin to understand why physical events
occur.- Elkind describes the main task of children at this level as the
"mastering [of] classes, relations, and quantities. 21 6 Level Four, the
formal operations period, occurs between eleven and fifteen years of
age. During this period, children can imagine the past, present, and
future conditions of a problem and create hypotheses about what
might logically occur under different conditions. They can engage in
pure thought independent of actions they see or perform. They can
hypothesize and draw deductions, understand theories, and combine
them to solve problems. Elkind describes the main task of children at
this level as "the conquest of thought."2 7 In Piagetian theory, by the
age of fifteen, a child's thinking has evolved into a mature state and
adult thought exists within the child's repertoire of mental functions.
2
20. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 284-85.
21. Id at 286-90.
22. David Elkind, Egocentrism in Adolescence, 38 Child Dev. 1025, 1026 (1967).
23. Thomas, supra note 16, at 290-95.
24. Elkind, supra note 22, at 1026-27.
25. Thomas, supra note 16, at 295-98.
26. Elkind, supra note 22, at 1027.
27. Id. at 1029.
28. Thomas, supra note 16, at 298-99.
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2. Piaget's Successors: Followers and Detractors, Recent Child
Development Theorists
Piaget's influence on child development theory cannot be over-
stated. Subsequent theorists have often reworked, as well as reacted
to, stage theory. The following subpart describes recent developments
in the field and the varied perspectives on children's competence for
decision making.
Theorists have criticized Piagetian Cognitive Development Theory
for a number of reasons.29 For example, Piaget studied only the aver-
age child and paid little attention to the effect the behavior of other
people might have on an individual.30 Further, he studied concepts
like space, number, and time that are not likely to be "contextually
dynamic."'" Moreover, Piaget's stages present somewhat inflexible
conceptual categories, and do not account for the interaction between
each child's unique environmental experiences and a person's particu-
lar genetic structure.32 Thus, his theory does not easily account for
differences among children in terms of acquired skills or in terms of
when the skills could be acquired.33 Some theorists have discounted
stage theory altogether. Gardner, Scherer, and Tester, for example,
believe that adolescent development does not occur in stages, and that
skills in different task domains develop at different times.34
On the other hand, some researchers have developed theories com-
patible with those of Piaget. For example, the ecological theory, as
developed by Urie Bronfenbrenner, explains to some extent an indi-
vidual child's deviance from Piaget's predictions and has elucidated
how social and physical settings affect development.3 5 Notwithstand-
ing these and other criticisms and refinements, Piaget's theories re-
29. See, e.g., Recent Advances in Cognitive-Developmental Theory: Progress in
Cognitive Development Research (Charles J. Brainerd ed., 1983) (surveying events in
the area of cognitive development theory, including broad empirical and theoretical
advances); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal
Contexts, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 221, 224-26 (1995) [hereinafter Scott, Evaluating
Adolescent Decision Making] (criticizing Piaget's theory of cognitive development,
offering alternative theories, and referring to the works of Gardner as well as of
Fischer and Silvern).
30. Barry J. Zimmerman, Social Learning Theory: A Contextualist Account of
Cognitive Functioning, in Recent Advances in Cognitive-Developmental Theory:
Progress in Cognitive Development Research 1, 4 (Charles J. Brainerd ed., 1983); see
also Thomas, supra note 16, at 316 (stating that Piaget "did not offer any careful
analysis of how different factors or agents in the social setting influence the attain-
ment of the wide variety of differences in cognitive functions that children exhibit").
31. Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 4.
32. See id. at 4-5.
33. See Laura M. Purdy, In Their Best Interest?: The Case Against Equal Rights
For Children 204-08 (1992).
34. WFilliam Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development
and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 Am. Psychologist 895, 898 (1989).
35. Urie Bronfenbrenner, The Ecology of Human Development: Experiments by
Nature and Design 9-10, 16-42 (1979).
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main an important guide to children's thinking processes and, when
modified by the conclusions of later cognitive theorists, provide a
framework to understand how children think. 6 Perhaps, as Gary
Melton says, "if research contradicts the Piagetian hypotheses at all, it
generally is in the direction of competence of even younger minors to
make personal decisions. 37
Many experiments, aside from those conducted by Piaget himself,
have confirmed his theories. In general, research suggests significant
differences between the cognitive abilities of children and adolescents
and little or no difference between the cognitive abilities of later ado-
lescents and adults. For example, Weithorn and Campbell studied de-
velopmental differences between children and adults when making
medical and psychiatric treatment decisions.3 8 In considering evi-
dence of choice, reasonable outcome, rational reasons, and under-
standing as measures of competency, this research team found that the
decision making of fourteen-year-olds did not differ from that of
adults, but that nine-year-olds demonstrated less competent decision
making.3 9 Another group of researchers, Nakajima and Hotta, stud-
ied how individuals searched for information in decision making.40
They found that children age twelve and under did not consider more
information than adults, but that children age fifteen and older pur-
sued more systematic methods of selection strategies.41 Yet another
researcher, Catherine Lewis, studied five areas of adolescents' deci-
sion making: "risk awareness; future orientation; sources of advice for
decisions; recognition of 'vested interests'; and revisions of attitudes
about adults in light of new information." 42 She found that older ado-
36. See Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, supra note 6, at 20-21; see also
Leslie Smith, Age, Ability, and Intellectual Development in Piagetian Theory, in Crite-
ria for Competence: Controversies in the Conceptualization and Assessment of Chil-
dren's Abilities 69, 87-88 (Michael Chandler & Michael Chapman eds., 1991)
(assessing the weaknesses in Piaget's theory but asserting its continued importance);
Thomas, supra note 16, at 306, 313-17 (stating that "over the past three decades
Piaget's writings have exerted a growing influence on the conduct of education," and
suggesting that most child development experts agree with the major features of
Piaget's structure-base stage model, but liberate it from certain constraints to make it
fit the current state of art).
37. Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68
Neb. L. Rev. 146, 153 (1989).
38. Lois A. Weithom & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Ad-
olescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 Child Dev. 1589, 1590-91 (1982).
39. Id. at 1595-96.
40. Yoshiaki Nakajima & Miho Hotta, A Developmental Study of Cognitive
Processes in Decision Making: Information Searching as a Function of Task Complex-
ity, 64 Psychol. Rep. 67 (1989). Denise Davidson also studied information searching
techniques and found that preschool children used incomplete and unsystematic strat-
egies. Denise Davidson, Children's Decision-Making Examined with an Information-
Board Procedure, 6 Cognitive Dev. 77, 79 (1991).
41. Nakajima & Hotta, supra note 40, at 77.
42. Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over
Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 Child Dev. 538 (1981).
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lescents considered risk and future consequences more frequently
than younger adolescents; better recognized vested interest on the
part of information providers; and more frequently consulted outside
experts.43 Denise Davidson, studying developmental differences in
decision making, found that the ability to focus selectively on relevant
information and to systematically compare information about alterna-
tives improves between the ages of ten and thirteen.' Grisso and Bel-
ter concluded that nine-year-olds had difficulty recognizing or
protecting their rights, while youths between the ages of fifteen and
twenty-one fared better than the nine-year olds, but performed
equally with each other in this regard.4 5 Catherine Lewis compared
decisions by adults and minors concerning pregnancy, 46 and found lit-
tle difference between adults' and children's knowledge of the law or
in their reasoning processes.47 Finally, Ambuel and Rappaport also
studied adolescents' competency in relation to pregnancy decisions.48
They found that, by middle adolescence, minors can "reason ab-
stractly about hypothetical situations, reason about multiple alterna-
tives and consequences, consider multiple variables, combine
variables in more complex ways, and use information systemati-
cally."' 49 Further they found no difference in legal competency be-
tween older minors and adults.50
These and other studies consistently demonstrate the general valid-
ity of Piagetian theory as reinterpreted by modem stage theorists.
The research indicates that children who have yet to enter early ado-
lescence and Piaget's formal operations stage process information dif-
ferently from both adults and older adolescents.5 These studies
further show that, as a matter of cognitive functioning, adolescents
possess a capacity equal to adults for making decisions about signifi-
cant life events.52 Piaget believed that adolescents acquired such skills
43. Id. at 541-42.
44. Denise Davidson, Developmental Differences in Children's Search of Predeci-
sional Information, 52 J. Experimental Child Psychol. 239, 241 (1991).
45. Ronald W. Belter & Thomas Grisso, Children's Recognition of Rights Viola-
tions in Counseling, 15 Prof. Psychol.: Res. & Prac. 899, 907-08 (1984); see also
Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 1134, 1143 (1980) (stating that juveniles under fifteen years of age
do not "understand the rights of silence and of counsel").
46. Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' and Adults' Pregnancy Deci-
sions, 50 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 446 (1980).
47. Id. at 451-52.
48. Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents'
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 Law & Hum. Behav.
129 (1992).
49. Id. at 147-48.
50. See id. at 145. Interestingly, they found that social support was the most con-
sistent psychosocial predictor of competence. Id at 146.
51. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
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around age fifteen.53 The research has also revealed that most chil-
dren (who are not subject to neurological or environmental deficien-
cies) probably acquire such skills even earlier.54
Some critics have questioned the conclusions drawn from these
studies. Elizabeth Scott correctly points out that only limited and per-
haps tentative empirical data supports the capability of adolescents to
make decisions as well as adults.55 She also questions whether the
research findings can be generalized across persons, settings, and
times.56 Notwithstanding these valid observations, observers cannot
ignore the consistency reported to date in the research on decision
making as it relates to cognitive functioning. Similarly, as the next
subpart describes, the research examining adolescent behavior has
also added to the debate regarding children's decision-making
competence.
3. Adolescent Behavior and Decision-Making Competence
Scott, and her colleagues Reppucci and Woolard, pose another chal-
lenge to those who would alter paternalistic policies that deprive chil-
dren of personal and legal autonomy.57 They believe that focusing on
cognitive functioning directs attention away from other historical ba-
ses for paternalistic policies.58 Using what they term the judgment
model,59 they propose to add adolescent behaviors, which appear to
be stage related (i.e., exist in adolescents but disappear as a person
grows older), to cognitive functioning in the decision-making equa-
tion. These behaviors include: (1) susceptibility to peer influence; (2)
a tendency to focus on immediate rather than long term conse-
quences; and (3) an inclination to make riskier choices than adults.6"
Although all adults "intuitively" recognize these adolescent traits,
some research suggests that this intuition may be verifiable. Research
has demonstrated the effects of peer and parental influence on social
comparison and conformity.61 Berndt's work, however, shows that
peer conformity in antisocial and neutral behaviors peaks around the
ninth grade.62 Other research also demonstrates that such influence
depends on the context and perhaps on the quality of the relation-
53. Piaget, supra note 18, at 61-62.
54. See supra notes 38-41, 44-45 and accompanying text.
55. Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37
V'll. L. Rev. 1607, 1632 (1992).
56. See id. at 1633 & n.98.
57. Scott, Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making, supra note 29, at 222-23.
58. Id. at 226-35.
59. Id. at 222.
60. Id.
61. Id- at 230. The article cites various studies that analyze the influence of peers
and parents in certain contexts.
62. Thomas J. Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers And Par-
ents, 15 Developmental Psychol. 608, 615 (1979). Berndt also found that the quality
of the parent-child relationship influenced conformity. See id. at 615-16.
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ship.63 Some research also reveals that adolescents have different per-
ceptions of risk than do adults,' but whether attitudes towards risk
remain constant across different decision-making contexts is unclear. 65
Other researchers, however, found little difference in the assessment
of risk by adults and adolescents since both believe that accidents hap-
pen to other people.66 Research also indicates differences between
adolescents and adults regarding temporal perspective.67 These stud-
ies demonstrate that adolescents generally place greater value on
short-term consequences while adults place a greater value on longer
term consequences. 68 On the other hand, Nurmi found that older ado-
lescents do orient towards the future when they consider issues such
as education, occupation, and family.69 As Scott and her colleagues
note, research concerning these concepts require further investiga-
tion.7" Nonetheless, this research brings to the debate on competency
a recognition of the environmental and psychosocial influences that
affect youths as they pass through adolescence. Piaget's cool calculat-
ing fifteen-year-old appears to be subject to some very hot influences
during adolescence. Such experiences must be taken into account in a
judge's assessment.
4. Learning and Decision-Making Competence
Cognitive functioning and influence of common adolescent behav-
ioral traits upon it, however, do not present the only issues to consider
when assessing decision-making competency. Decision making and
judgment, like most other activities in life, constitute learned skils.7'
As Piaget and others have noted, learning involves a dynamic pro-
cess.7' Human beings process information by adding new information
to their cognitive structures and then reformulating the cognitive
structures to account for new, different, and more complex informa-
tion.73 Knowledge develops through contextual interactions and in-
63. Scott, Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making, supra note 29, at 230.
64. Id. at 230-31 (citing various research studies).
65. Id.
66. Marilyn Jacobs Quadrel et al., Adolescent (In)vulnerability, 48 Am. Psycholo-
gist 102, 104-05 (1993). They also found that adults and teens rely on similar psycho-
logical processes when estimating risk. Id. at 112.
67. Scott, Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making, supra note 29, at 231.
68. Id.
69. Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future?: A Review of the De-
velopment of Future Orientation and Planning, 11 Developmental Rev. 1, 28 (1991).
70. Scott, Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making, supra note 29, at 232.
71. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Changing Legal World of Adolescence 91 (1982)
(maintaining that young people acquire maturity and judgment through learning).
72. See Piaget, supra note 18, at 28 (stating that "[a]ll knowledge doubtless sup-
poses an intervention of experience"); see also id. at 46-51 (outlining, for example,
biological, equilibration, social, educational, and cultural factors as contributive ele-
ments to cognitive function).
73. See Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Con-
ceptual Development, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1269, 1293 (1991) (citing the work of researchers
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creases when an individual tests it against a set of circumstances,
reformulates it in relation to the current experience, and stores it for
further use.74 Each iteration of the testing process refines the knowl-
edge or skill and serves to improve performance if it is used again.
Not surprisingly, most people, subject to hereditary limits, improve a
skill each time they use it. Improvement of skills upon repeated use
applies to making judgments or decisions as well.75 Decision making
involves, after all, a process of making choices among competing
courses of action.76 The decision maker identifies possible options,
considers the possible consequences that follow from each option,
evaluates the desirability of each, ascertains the likelihood of each
consequence, and assesses all of these considerations against some de-
cisional rule, such as maximizing well-being or enjoyment.77 One
would expect that people who have increased their knowledge base
through multiple reformulations and refinements acquired through re-
peated encounters with the information should make better decisions.
Early attempts at decision making may produce errors in judgment
and bad decisions; but improvement occurs over time and with re-
peated efforts. Thus, as the sages remind us, experience is a good
teacher. Professor Frank Zimring has viewed adolescence as a
learner's permit for adulthood,78 stating that: "If the exercise of in-
dependent choice is an essential element of maturity, part of the pro-
cess of becoming mature is learning to make independent
decisions. 79 Improving one's ability to make good decisions requires
practice. Thus, the experience of making judgements in context
presents as important a factor as cognitive development and the influ-
ence of normal adolescent behavior traits in developing good deci-
sion-making skills.
This part provided a backdrop to development theory and how
these theories explain children's decision-making capabilities. The
following part explores how judges accept and discount children's
preferences and choices in a number of legal contexts, including adop-
tion and custody, abortion, medical and mental health treatment, and
delinquency cases.
and commentators focusing on social cognition, political cognition, and critical
thinking).
74. Cf. Zinring, supra note 71, at 89-91 (positing that "[b]eing mature takes
practice").
75. Cf. Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking In Adolescence: A Deci-
sion-Making Perspective, 12 Developmental Rev. 1, 29 (1992) (asserting that acquisi-
tion of decision-making skills "may depend both on cognitive structural characteristics
at a given point in time and on the opportunities which experience has provided for
acquiring given skills").
76. Id. at 3 ("Decision theorists define decision making as the process of making
choices among competing courses of actions.").
77. Id at 3-4.
78. Zimring, supra note 71, at 89-96.
79. Id. at 91.
1996] 1885
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS OF CHILDREN'S DECISION-MAKING
CAPACITY
When a child states a preference or chooses a course of action in a
courtroom, all of the factors discussed in part I influence that decision.
One would suspect that a rich literature exists concerning judicial de-
cision making in the context of children's choices about their lives.
Unfortunately, little has been written about how judges evaluate chil-
dren's decisions that are made in a legal context. Trial judges are sel-
dom the authors of those articles that do exist. Most of the published
articles seek to advise judges about the proper method for asking
questions and obtaining information, to analyze the law, or to discuss
the practical effects of the setting in which the judge obtains the infor-
mation from the child. When they do write, judges usually do so in
the form of opinions, more often at the appellate rather than the trial
level. These opinions seldom offer more than generalizations about a
child's legal competency to state a preference, or make a choice. They
contain little guidance concerning how trial judges should evaluate the
preferences children state, or how research into child development ac-
tually informs a judge's decision. The subsections that follow explore,
as well as is possible, how judges actually use child development the-
ory; and, if they do not, how they evaluate capacity when children
state a preference for a particular course of action.
A. Custody and Adoption Cases
Although only a few state statutes or cases command a court to
follow the expressed wishes of a child in custody and adoption cases,
many require that the judge consider the child's wishes.80 "The vari-
ables that should affect the weight to be given to the child's preference
[however] are seldom defined by law [and] little is known about how
the child's wishes affect the calculations judges make in different cases
and under different statutes."'' s Aside from judicial opinions, few
judges have written about how they evaluate expressions of prefer-
ence made by a child. Reporting on the efforts of a Massachusetts
committee of lawyers and judges created to improve court proceed-
ings in custody cases, family court judge Edward Ginsberg stated that
children's expressed preferences should not be taken at face value
since children improperly assess their own long-term interests, rely on
unrealistic expectations and promises, and may manipulate or be
80. States have long experimented with the proper age at which to accord control
of custody decisions to children. See Lawrence A. Moskowitz, Divorce-Custody Dis-
positions: The Child's Wishes in Perspective, 18 Santa Clara L. Rev. 427, 431-34
(1978).
81. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children's Preference in Adjudicated Custody Deci-




manipulated by parents.82 Significantly, neither the guidelines of the
Massachusetts committee nor the judge discussed child development
theory or even "common sense" distinctions between older or
younger children. Judge J. Peter Ault of Illinois wrote that a judge
acting as questioner "can get a sense of the maturity of the minor and
the voluntariness of the minor's statements ... the reasoning behind
the child's statement of preference... [and] the strength or depth of
his or her preference. '83 While he and the Illinois courts believe that
the preference should be given "most serious consideration,"' Judge
Ault offers no insight into how he or other judges should evaluate a
child's social maturity or cognitive competency to make choices.
Judges have discussed how they evaluate children's expressed pref-
erences with researchers who have studied judicial attitudes or judicial
interviewing techniques. Frederica Lombard surveyed and questioned
twenty-six judges regarding their decision making in contested cus-
tody cases in several counties surrounding Detroit, Michigan.8 5 She
found that judges spent an average of eighteen minutes with children
who were the subjects of custody battles.8 6 She concluded that, while
judges claimed to inquire into the underlying reasons for the child's
preference in order to evaluate it, a judge could obtain little of the
information needed for such an evaluation in a span of eighteenminutes.87
Scott, Reppucci, and Aber conducted a similar study in Virginia.8
This group found that a correlation existed between the age of the
child and the weight accorded to children's preferences by the judge.89
They further found that judges relied on the social norms that sup-
ported the participation by adolescents in significant decisions that af-
fect their lives.9° With respect to children below the age of six, most
judges considered the child's wishes to be irrelevant.91 By contrast,
82. Edward M. Ginsburg, Guidelines For Child Custody Cases, 26 Boston B.J. 23,
24 (Oct. 1982).
83. J. Peter Ault, Out of the Mouths of Babes: Determinations of Child Custodial
Preference in Illinois, 23 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 383, 395 (1992).
84. ld. at 385 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rosenberger, 316 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. App. Ct.
1974)).
85. Frederica K. Lombard, Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An
Empirical and Analytical Study, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 807, 809 (1984).
86. Id. at 826. In Colorado, 15 minutes seems to be the norm. See Jessica Pearson
& Maria A. Luchesi Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J.
Farn. L. 703, 720 (1983).
87. Lombard, supra note 85, at 829; see also Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan Berlin
Kelly, Surviving the Break Up: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce 161-78
(1980) (describing the contextual complexity of divorce cases and its effects on chil-
dren's thinking).
88. Scott, Children's Preference in Custody Decisions, supra note 81, at 1037.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1046. Children under six were involved in 50% of the cases, and fewjudges even interviewed such children. Id. at 1046-47.
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ninety percent of the judges deemed children's wishes to be either
dispositive or extremely important when they were fourteen years old
and older.92 Reidy, Silver, and Carlson found similar inclinations ex-
pressed by judges interviewed in California, 93 as did Lowery in inter-
views with judges in Kentucky.94 The Scott, Reppucci, and Aber
study reported that none of the judges interviewed in Virginia relied
specifically on child development theory for acceding to the children's
desires. Rather, the intensity with which the children expressed their
preferences, their practical ability to defy the order, and their "right"
to a significant voice in the decision by virtue of their proximity to
adulthood provided the basis for such judicial accession. 95
Appellate judges write generally about evaluating a child's prefer-
ence in contested custody cases when reviewing trial court decisions.
In a 1977 analysis of appellate opinions concerning the role of the
child's preference in custody cases, Siegel and Hurley found that the
most widely accepted test was "that the child must be of 'sufficient
mental capacity to make an informed and intelligent choice'" before
his or her choice would be accorded any weight.96 This pair concluded
that, while appellate courts encouraged trial judges to actually ex-
amine the child's mental capacity, some appellate courts presume the
incapacity of young children and most appellate courts presume the
capacity of older adolescents. 97 An analysis of more recent cases con-
cerning adoption and custody reached similar results.98
Relying on appellate cases for guidance presents a problem because
the opinions discuss generalized legal rules regarding the mental ca-
pacity of children, but do not explain the mental calculations used by
the trial judge to ascertain that capacity. Those calculations seldom, if
ever, become part of the appellate record. Moreover, few cases even
reach the appellate court, and trial judges rarely publish their reason-
ing in individual cases. Thus, the legal community working with chil-
dren has a dim understanding about how judges make those decisions.
92. Id. at 1050.
93. Thomas J. Reidy et al., Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 23 Fam.
L.Q. 75, 79, 84 (1989).
94. Carol R. Lowery, Child Custody Decisions in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey
of Judges, 12 Prof. Psychol. 492, 495 (1981).
95. Scott, Children's Preference in Custody Decisions, supra note 81, at 1050-51.
96. David M. Siegel & Suzanne Hurley, The Role of the Child's Preference in Cus-
tody Proceedings, 11 Fain. L.Q. 1, 2 (1977) (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 4.
98. Searches for both custody and adoption were conducted on Westlaw and
Lexis. Various combinations of the following key words were used to locate cases:
custody, adoption, child, preference, choice, age, mental capacity, maturity, and
West's key number 211k19.2(4). See, e.g., Massengale v. Massengale, No. 03A01-9503-
CV-00086, 1995 WL 579261, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1995) (admitting testi-
mony of nine-year-old regarding his preferences in custody dispute, but ultimately
discounting his viewpoint); Sargent v. Sargent, 460 S.E.2d 596, 599-600 (Va. Ct. App.
1995) (affirming trial court's decision to refuse to find determinative the uncontro-
verted evidence regarding nine-year-old's preferences in custody dispute).
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Conversations with judges and litigants seem to indicate that judges
typically observe the child's demeanor, and consider the child's signifi-
cant accomplishments and IQ test results when making the decisions.
Ample anecdotal evidence supports the view that judges base deci-
sions on intuition and a common understanding of social norms. Lit-
tle evidence, however, indicates any systematic use of child
development research and theory to inform such decisions.
B. Abortion Cases
In a line of cases beginning with Bellotti v. Baird,99 the Supreme
Court decided that a minor who is mature enough and sufficiently well
informed may make abortion decisions independent of parental con-
sent or notification or judicial interference."°° The Supreme Court has
noted the difficulty of defining maturity and determining its exist-
ence. 1 ' Although the Court requires case-by-case determinations of
a child's maturity, it has given no guidance about how maturity is to
be ascertained.
Furthermore, trial judges have revealed little about how they ascer-
tain maturity. It appears that no judges have written any articles on
the topic. Trial courts keep proceedings confidential and seal records,
thus rendering direct insight into a judge's rationale inaccessible. Few
cases reach the appellate courts.'0 2 Those cases that have received
appellate review suggest that trial judges intuit maturity from their
perceptions of the children's demeanor while testifying.'0 3 Such cases
also indicate that judges evaluate the coherence of the child's re-
sponse to questions concerning child rearing, abortion procedures and
risks, adoption, and the child's postoperative plans.'0 4 The Supreme
99. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
100. Id. at 643. The Court in Bellotti held that even if the trial court believed that
an abortion is not in the child's best interest, it should not interfere in the decision of
a mature minor. Id. at 650. Prior to Bellotti, the Supreme Court, in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), ruled that a state could not confer upon a
parent absolute veto power over a child's desire to have an abortion. Id. at 74.
101. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44 n.23.
102. A survey by Mnookin and Cartoof found that every pregnant minor who
sought judicial authorization in Massachusetts between 1981 and 1983 received it.
Robert H. Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird, A Hard Case, in In the Interest of Children:
Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy 149, 239 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
Out of 477 judicial assessments for authorization in Massachusetts between Decem-
ber 1981 and June 1985, only nine children were found to be immature. Susanne Yates
& Anita J. Pliner, Judging Maturity in the Courts: The Massachusetts Consent Statute,
78 Am. J. Pub. Health 646, 647 (1988).
103. A sample of cases was selected from a Westlaw search using 4K.50 (Abortion
and Birth Control) and examined to ascertain the judges' reasoning. See, e.g., In re
T.P., 475 N.E.2d 312, 314-15 (Ind. 1985) (holding that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in making a determination based on facts presented as well as the attitudes
and judgments of the child).
104. See, e.g., In re Moe, 423 N.E.2d 1038, 1042-43 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (focusing
on lack of life experience and understanding of the responsibilities of motherhood in
light of abortion decision); In re Anonymous, 650 So. 2d 919, 920 (Ala. Civ. App.
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Court of Alabama has recognized that trial judges sometimes rely on a
more negative rationale. In the Alabama Supreme Court's view, a
minor's maturity may not be evaluated through the prism of a judge's
personal feelings towards abortion or towards adolescence. 10 5 None-
theless, trial courts not following the Alabama admonition often focus
on the child's general behavior in determining maturity.10 6 For exam-
ple, some courts consider unwed pregnancy itself to be a sign of
immaturity. °7
The Supreme Court of Kansas has attempted to define the concept
of mature minor. It has instructed trial courts to determine whether a
child possesses "the intellectual capacity, experience, and knowledge
necessary to substantially understand the situation at hand and the
consequences of the choices that can be made."' 08 In determining
whether to grant or deny permission to obtain the abortion without
parental notification, other courts also seem to concentrate on the
knowledge possessed by the petitioner.10 9 This reliance on the con-
cepts of maturity and knowledge reflects, in part, a use of the doctrine
of informed consent. Researchers and doctors employ the informed
consent doctrine to insure that human subjects used in medical re-
search and patients subject to risky medical procedures understand
the procedures in question. Knowledge, voluntariness, and capacity
comprise the elements of informed consent." 0 The knowledge prong
requires that the person have a fair understanding of the nature of the
activity and its procedure, and the attendant risks, discomforts, bene-
fits, and alternatives to the procedure."' Voluntariness suggests a vo-
1994) (discussing lack of medical consultation, inadequate postoperative plans, and
failure to consider the emotional aspects of abortion).
105. Ex parte Anonymous, 618 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ala. 1993).
106. See, e.g., In re Doe I, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 1990) (upholding trial
court's finding that pregnant minor did not prove necessary maturity, where she had
had prior abortion less than a year ago, second child was fathered by a different man,
and minor had stopped using birth control); H.B. v. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 957-
58 (D. Utah 1986) (finding that minor demonstrated unrealistic judgment given her
reliance upon advice of fellow teenagers, her expectation of keeping the pregnancy
secret from her parents if medical complications arose, and her cavalier attitude about
the ease of abortion).
107. See Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Note, When is a Pregnant Minor Mature? When is an
Abortion in Her Best Interest? The Ohio Supreme Court Applies Ohio's Abortion
Parental Notification Law: In re Jane Doe I, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 907, 932 (1991).
108. In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
109. The Supreme Court has suggested a mature minor is one who can appreciate
the nature and consequences of an abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1976).
110. According to Grisso and Vierling, they are also the traits used to judge the
legal competence of a mature minor. Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Con-
sent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 1978 Prof. Psychol. 412, 412-16.
111. See Patricia Keith-Spiegel, Children and Consent to Participate in Research, in
Children's Competence to Consent 179, 186 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (citing
1971 H.E.W. guidelines concerning research on humans); see also Ambuel & Rap-
paport, supra note 48, at 132 (listing cognitive and volitional qualities as characteris-
tics of informed consent).
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litional act devoid of undue influence."' Capacity means the mental
ability to use the information and to make a rational choice. The
courts that use an informed consent analysis to permit an abortion
without parental notification or consent inquire into the quantity of
information the child possesses about the abortion process, the birth
process, child rearing, and the risks and benefits arising from the vari-
ous options. Such courts also examine the child's sources of informa-
tion. Based upon the child's recitation of this information" 3 as well as
the child's age, education, and behavior, the court rules on the child's
maturity.
Ostensibly, courts utilizing this construct analyze the child's capac-
ity to understand the semantic content of the information provided by
others, and the child's ability to arrive at the decision through a ra-
tional process by attempting to ascertain the knowledge the child pos-
sesses and voluntariness of the choice. 114 To determine decision-
making capacity, a judge must have some sense of the general cogni-
tive functioning of children of the same developmental stage as the
petitioner, and more importantly, a good sense of the cognitive func-
tioning of the petitioner herself. Because these cases move quickly
through the courts, however, neither type of evidence regularly be-
comes part of the proceedings. For example, a 1988 study in Massa-
chusetts concerning the impact of parental consent laws found that the
average hearing lasted twelve minutes.115 Ninety-two percent of the
hearings took less than twenty minutes and some lasted as little as five
minutes." 6 Often, the petitioner is the only witness, and no cross-
examination occurs. In such an arena, a decision concerning capacity
can be made only with reference to an individual judge's personal
knowledge and beliefs regarding child development, general social
norms, and the child's general demeanor on the witness stand. Thus,
the judge's own idiosyncratic beliefs about children, adolescents, or
abortion will play a significant role in the determination of capacity.
Because such a scenario does not involve judges' employing normal
rules concerning proof in the litigation process, the result of these
hearings is practically preordained: no opposing party challenges the
evidence and the court, thus, bases its finding regarding the minor's
112. Keith-Spiegel, supra note 111, at 194; Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 48, at
132.
113. The appellate cases seem to suggest that often the child is the only witness and
no cross-examination takes place unless pursued by the trial judge. See, e.g., In re
Anonymous, 655 So. 2d 1052, 1053-54 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (basing decision on mi-
nor's testimony despite the absence of cross-examination); In re Anonymous, 549 So.
2d 1347, 1347 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (noting that child was the only witness); In re
Moe, 423 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (referring only to the petitioner's
responses in making determination of maturity).
114. See Grisso & Vierling, supra note 110, at 418-19.




maturity either -on the one-sided evidence presented, or on idiosyn-
cratic biases.
C. Cases Involving Medical or Mental Health Treatment
Judges may become involved in several health decisions other than
those relating to pregnancy and abortion. Hospitals and social service
agencies often petition the court for authority to perform surgical or
other medical procedures on a child when parents or children refuse
to consent to these procedures. Similarly, mental health personnel
may seek court orders permitting them to administer psychotropic
drugs when children refuse to take these drugs. Additionally, parents
and hospitals may seek permission to perform medical procedures
such as marrow or kidney removal on willing or nonprotesting chil-
dren when the procedure will benefit a third person but cause some
risk to the donor. Neglected or delinquent children may also object to
being placed in a private residential treatment center as part of their
disposition.117 Finally, parents and hospitals often seek authority to
remove life sustaining therapies when no amount of treatment will
save a child's life, or to compel such therapies against the child's will.
In each of these cases, courts must consider the child's capacity to
consent or refuse to participate in the procedure.
As with other situations, judges have not written law journal articles
about how they make these decisions. Although a substantial number
of appellate cases exist, trial judges seldom publish their opinions.
Older appellate opinions usually involve the liability of doctors who
performed surgical procedures on children without the consent of the
parents" 8 or the administration of blood transfusions to children
whose parents objected because of religious beliefs." 9 In the former,
the cases split between those that recognized a mature minor excep-
117. These cases are slightly different from mental health commitments governed
procedurally by Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979). In mental health commit-
ment cases, the child's need for treatment rather than his or her capacity to consent to
treatment is at issue. In the neglect and delinquency cases, the placement is more
likely to be one of several factors that can aid in the child's rehabilitation or upbring-
ing rather than being one that is absolutely necessary. See D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2320
(1981 & Supp. 1995) (setting out procedures for placement of neglected or delinquent
children).
118. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Medical Practitioner's Liability For Treat-
ment Given Child Without Parent's Consent, 67 A.L.R.4th 511 (1989).
119. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641,652 (Fam. Ct. 1970), aff'd, Sampson
v. Taylor, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972) (involving neglect case brought by government
against the parent, a Jehovah's Witness, because of her refusal to consent to blood
transfusion for the child); In re Gregory S., 380 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (Fain. Ct. 1976)
(involving neglect case brought by government against the parent, a member of the
Church of God and Christ, because of her refusal to consent to medical and dental
treatment for her three children); see also In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 821 (N.Y.
1955) (involving a child in need of surgery for a cleft palate and harelip whose parent
withheld consent because of his belief in "mental healing").
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tion and those that did not.120 The common law mature minor rule
called for an analysis of the nature of the medical procedure, its likely
benefit, and the capacity of the minor to understand what the medical
procedure involved.1 2 ' In the latter, the courts routinely ordered that
the transfusions be given. Neither type of case paid much attention to
how the courts were to determine maturity. The liability cases only
discussed the existence of the doctrine, whereas other health-related
cases discussed the rights of the parents as opposed to the rights of
mature minors.122
As painful but potentially successful treatment regimens become in-
creasingly common, courts will consider greater numbers of health-
related cases. In California, police armed with a court order dragged
a fifteen-year-old girl out of her home and forced her to undergo
chemotherapy. She and her family, members of the Hmong culture,
had objected to the therapy. The doctors who sought the court order
later relented and the judge lifted the order.12 3 In Massachusetts, a
sixteen-year-old boy fled his home rather than continue chemother-
apy. His parents and doctors relented and he began an alternative
therapy. 24 In Florida, a boy who had received two liver transplants
stopped taking his anti-rejection medicine because he could no longer
bear the painful side effects. A court ruled that he had the right to
refuse treatment, and he later died.12
5
Some trial and appellate court opinions have begun to discuss the
mature minor concept with respect to treatment decisions. In 1986,
Judge Leonard Edwards II of the Santa Clara County Superior Court
in California considered the maturity of a fourteen-year-old cancer
patient who, with her parent's consent, refused blood transfusions for
religious reasons, and threatened to leave the hospital if the court
ruled against her. 26 In upholding the girl's choice, the judge noted
her
120. Tennessee, for example, has long recognized the mature minor doctrine in
medical liability cases, although none of the Tennessee cases involve a child's choice
to die rather than accept treatment. See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745-46(Tenn. 1987).
121. See Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Mass. 1977) (citing
Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 Osgoode Hall L.J. 115,
117-19 (1973)).
122. See, e.g., In re Gregory S., 380 N.Y.S.2d at 62i-22 (describing circumstances
under which the state may restrict parents' control over their children for public pol-
icy reasons); In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (same).
123. Kathryn Dore Perkins, Kids Asserting Rights in Health Care; Support Grows




126. Mike McKee, Blood Feud; When Jehovah's Witnesses Refuse Transfusions
Based on Their Beliefs, The Legal and Medical Guidelines Are Far From Clear, The
Recorder, Aug. 15, 1995, at *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File.
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intelligence, poise, dignity and forcefulness .... She appeared to
have focused clearly on the difficult task facing her .... She had
attended all counseling sessions, agreed to a plan of therapy, devel-
oped a coherent philosophy on how she as a human being would
face this medical challenge, and she came to the court with the
poignant request-'respect my decision." 27
Appellate courts have diverged in their determination concerning a
mature minor's choice in life-threatening situations. On the one hand,
a Georgia federal court found no such right.'2 8 Similarly, in In re
Long Island Jewish Medical Center,"29 the New York courts recog-
nized the merit of the mature minor concept, but refused to permit a
seventeen-year-old adherent of the Jehovah's Witness faith to reject a
life-saving blood transfusion. 30 The court simply found the child to
be lacking in maturity.' 3 ' In O.G., P.G., and M.G. v. Baum,132 the
court rejected the wishes of a sixteen-year-old who refused to accept a
blood transfusion because the legal representative presented no evi-
dence of his client's maturity, and the child himself did not testify. 33
On the other hand, some courts have endorsed the mature minor
concept in life-threatening situations. In In re Swan,'3 the court ruled
that prior statements by a seventeen-year-old minor who was a "nor-
mally mature high school senior" were sufficient to show- his desire
not to kept alive by heroic measures. 135 The court permitted his par-
ents to effectuate his wishes, 36 thus permitting the child to die. 37
Likewise, Illinois has fully embraced the doctrine even when its invo-
cation may result in death. In In re E.G. '138 doctors, lawyers, and psy-
chiatrists testified to the seventeen-year-old child's maturity to reject a
blood transfusion. 139 The child testified as well. 140 In reaching its de-
cision, the Illinois Supreme Court noted both the "sliding scale of ma-
turity" that existed within the Illinois Code, and the existence of the
127. Id. at *3-4.
128. Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F.Supp. 1559, 1575-76
(N.D. Ga. 1994).
129. 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
130. Id. at 243.
131. Id-
132. 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tx. Ct. App. 1990).
133. Id. at 842.
134. 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990).
135. Id. at 1206; see also In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 723 (Ga. 1984) (indicating, in
a case involving withdrawing life support procedures from an infant, that the adult
right to withhold or withdraw life sustaining procedures was available despite the per-
son's youth).
136. In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1206 (Me. 1990).
137. Id.
138. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
139. Id. at 323-24.
140. Id. at 324.
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mature minor doctrine, which emanates from abortion cases. 41 In
ruling that a mature minor could choose death, the Illinois court, how-
ever, did not enunciate a standard for maturity.142 It simply accepted
the trial judge's factual determination that the child was mature.1 43
In cases where the court accepts the mature minor concept in life-
threatening situations, the courts have looked for some evidence of
informed consent to demonstrate maturity. Both the Illinois and the
Santa Clara county judges attempted to satisfy themselves that the
children knew what they were doing. Both held lengthy hearings and
considered evidence, which showed that the child in each case had
been fully informed. These courts also heard testimony concerning
each child's ability to understand the information. Further, the courts'
perceptions, gained from the children's testimony, supported the find-
ing of maturity.
D. Cases Involving Assertions or Waivers of Right in the
Delinquency Context
Judges are called upon to make several decisions in juvenile delin-
quency cases that require assessment of a child's competency or ma-
turity. For example, judges must decide whether a child is validly
waiving his right to trial when he pleads guilty."' Judges also rou-
tinely determine whether a child's waiver of the right to counsel is
valid.' 45 In both situations, the court must ascertain whether the chil-
dren have knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily relinquished the
constitutional rights involved."4 Additionally, a police officer must
advise a child of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent before
questioning him about criminal activities. 47 Questioning should not
proceed unless the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waives that right.' 43 Thus, before a prosecutor may use the child's
statements to the police against him in a trial, a judge must determine
if a valid waiver of the right to silence took place before the question-
ing began.
141. Id. at 326-27. One of the dissenting judges noted the difference between cases
recognizing the doctrine when the preservation of life and health is at stake in con-
trast to recognizing it when life and health are destroyed. Id at 328-29 (Ward, J.,
dissenting).
142. See id at 328.
143. Ia By the time the case was finally decided, the minor had legally become an
adult. Id at 324.
144. The Constitution requires that children receive notice of the charges against
them and a hearing to determine their guilt. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
145. The Constitution guarantees children the right to counsel. Id at 36-37; see gen-
erally Barry C. Feld, Justice For Children: The Right To Counsel and the Juvenile
Courts 19-24 (1993) (noting that juvenile delinquency proceedings afford essentially
the same procedural protections as criminal prosecutions).
146. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-28 (1979).




In all these instances, the court must assess a child's cognitive ability
to determine: (1) whether the child processed the information re-
ceived about the rights involved; (2) whether the child engaged in ra-
tional decision making; and (3) whether the child waived the right
volitionally. When a child decides to plead guilty or defend himself
without a lawyer, a judge evaluates a decision that occurs at the time
of the hearing.'49 In this instance, the judge exerts some control over
the quality and the quantity of the information the child receives con-
cerning that right before the child decides, and can probe to deter-
mine whether the child needs more information. By contrast, when a
child decides to waive rights in the context of police interrogation, he
does so in the police station-long before the court hearing to assess
the voluntariness of the waiver occurs. Thus, these sorts of judicial
assessments of the child's capacity offer qualitatively different deter-
minations from those concerning guilty pleas or waivers of trial
counsel.
As with cases concerning custody, abortion, and health matters,
trial judges seldom write about their thought processes. Some trial
court opinions exist but no legal commentaries have been found.
Again, as with the other kinds of cases, appellate opinions offer the
major source of information concerning trial judges' reasoning. Un-
fortunately, they provide little guidance because they seldom indicate
how the trial court judge evaluated cognitive processes.
Appellate decisions regarding these matters require that the trial
judge evaluate the "totality of the circumstances" each time a child
waives a right. This approach mandates that the court inquire into
and evaluate the child's age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence to determine whether the child has the capacity to under-
stand the nature of the right relinquished and the consequences of
doing so.150 Courts apply this standard regardless of the child's age.
When appellate courts review trial court decisions, they determine
whether such factors were considered but not how the trial court
judge considered them.
Many consequences result from a plea of guilty. Not only do chil-
dren admit guilt and subject themselves to sanctions, they also give up
many legal rights associated with trial and appeal. When judges con-
duct hearings at which a plea of guilty is entered, they must insure that
a child understands the consequences of pleading guilty and that the
plea is entered without coercion. 151 Nonetheless, physical or mental
149. Although the child may have arrived at the decision to plead or waive counsel
prior to the hearing, the decision is made, as a matter of law, in court.
150. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725.
151. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240 (1969); McCarthy v. United States,
394 U.S. 459,463-65 (1969). Many juvenile courts follow Boykin. See In re Maricopa
County Juvenile Action No. J-86715, 594 P.2d 554, 556-57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (cit-
ing In re Beasly, 362 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978), In re
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deficiencies will not necessarily render a plea of guilty involuntary or
unintelligent.152 Nor will an inability to understand part of the offense
for which a person is charged render the plea invalid.'1 3 When alleged
delinquents possess such infirmities, the judge must consider the infor-
mation available to help the child, the degree of his confusion or inca-
pacity, and the effect of his lack of comprehension on the decision.' 4
Sophisticated courts require that a judge conduct an informed con-
sent dialogue with the child before a plea of guilty is taken. 155 The
District of Columbia, for example, requires judges to advise the child
of the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered and the
maximum period of supervision permissible;
(2) That the respondent has the right to plead not guilty or to per-
sist in that plea if it has already been made, the right to be tried
by a judicial officer and at that factfinding hearing the right to
the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-ex-
amine adverse witnesses, and the right against compelled self-
incrimination;
(3) That if a plea of guilty is accepted by the Court there will not be
a further factfinding hearing, so that by pleading guilty the re-
spondent waives the right to a factfinding hearing; [and]
(4) That if the respondent pleads guilty, the judicial officer may ask
the respondent questions about the offense to which the respon-
dent has pleaded, and if the respondent answers these questions
under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, the
respondent's answers may later be used against the respondent
in a criminal or juvenile proceeding for perjury or false
statement.1
56
Further, the court must examine whether the child's willingness to
plead guilty results from prior discussions between the prosecutor and
I
Ronald E., 562 P.2d 684 (Cal. 1977), and In re Michael M., 96 Cal. Reptr. 887 (Ct.
App. 1970)).
152. See, e.g., Roy v. Perrin, 441 A.2d 1151, 1156 (N.H. 1982) ("[D]eficiencies in a
criminal defendant's physical and mental make-up do not necessarily compel a finding
that [the defendant's] plea was involuntary and unintelligent."); In re C.L.W., 467
A.2d 706, 709 (D.C. 1983) (finding that defendant "knowingly and intelligently"
waived his Miranda rights despite his mental deficiencies).
153. See, e.g., Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.) ("[W]e hold that incapac-
ity to understand part of the elements of the offense with which one is charged does
not without more, make a guilty plea involuntary in constitutional terms."), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978).
154. Id. at 3; see also State v. Thompson, 545 P.2d 925, 927 (Ariz. 1976) (holding
that a 17-year-old having a schizoid personality could still enter a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary plea).
155. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
156. D.C. Super. Ct. R. 11(b)(1)-(4) (Juv.); see also Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion & American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Standards: Standards Relating to
Adjudication 3.2 (1980) [hereinafter IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards] (listing




the child or the attorney for the child; and must insure that the child
enters the plea voluntarily-without force, threats, or promises apart
from the plea agreement.'57
Most judges, however, do not replicate the kind of informed con-
sent dialogue expected by the doctrine. Like most other hearings in-
volving children's preferences, plea of guilty hearings seldom last
more than fifteen to thirty minutes. 158 Moreover, courts sometimes
engage in perfunctory dialogues.'5 9 Even if the court conducts a thor-
ough hearing, such a proceeding seldom involves more than a well-
rehearsed, ritualized litany. For example, judges merely ask the ques-
tion: "Do you understand that if you plead guilty, X will happen?"
The child typically responds: "Yes." Arguably, judges probably ex-
pect the child's lawyer to provide the information that the child needs
to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision, and view the
hearing as merely a check on the lawyer's work.'6 . Such reliance is
misplaced. The quality of lawyering in juvenile and criminal courts
does not prove to be uniformly high.' 6' Moreover, the courts of ap-
peal have recognized that the duty to verify that the plea is valid re-
sides primarily with the judge and that duty is particularly stringent
when the alleged delinquent exhibits signs of immaturity.' 61
Nonetheless, courts accept pleas of guilty in the vast majority of
juvenile delinquency cases. Courts seldom deny children the opportu-
nity to plead guilty when they seek to do so. Many reasons account
for this practice.' 63 Few reasons, unfortunately, correspond to a solici-
tous and scrupulous assessment of a child's capacity to waive the
rights associated with trial.
Judges' reasoning concerning the waiver of the right to counsel dur-
ing juvenile delinquency proceedings presents an even more mysteri-
157. D.C. Super. Ct. R. 11(c) (Juv.).
158. I have represented children accused of crimes for over 25 years. I rarely have
seen a hearing last longer than 30 minutes. Most hearings take much less time.
159. See, e.g., In re John R., 419 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627 (App. Div. 1979). In that case,
the juvenile judge merely advised the child that he could "waive the right to a trial
and make an admission" and asked whether the child "want[ed] to make an admission
or... want[ed] to have a trial." Idt; see also People v. Stewart, 356 N.E.2d 991, 992-93
(Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (showing that the court conducted an inquiry of a 14-year-old that
consisted of five questions).
160. Some courts have explicitly stated that the defense lawyer as well as the judge
has a duty to provide the information. See, e.g., Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 131
(8th Cir. 1977) (discussing counsel's role with a 15-year-old "immature" first of-
fender). Indeed, a lawyer would be remiss if he did not do so. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.4 (1992); IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 156, at 3.6.
161. See Feld, supra note 145, at 249-52 (citing studies and examples of poor lawy-
ering); see also Rinehart, 561 F.2d at 129-31 (citing appellee's counsel as an example
of the poor quality of lawyering in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
162. See Rinehart, 561 F.2d at 131.
163. It is no secret that children who admit their guilt gain more favorable disposi-
tions than those who go to trial. Further, urban courts would grind to a halt if all
children chose to go to trial.
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ous process. 164 In a recent study of the right to counsel in Minnesota,
Barry Feld found that over one-half of the children alleged to be de-
linquent waived their right to counsel.' 65 In some counties, more than
eighty percent of twelve- and thirteen-year-old children waived that
right. 6 The waiver of the right to counsel, like the entry of a plea of
guilty, must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court
makes this determination by looking at the "totality of the
circumstances." 67
When a child who is represented by counsel enters a plea of guilty,
presumably he or she has received some assistance in making the deci-
sion. When the child waives the right to counsel, only the judge
monitors the informed consent dialogue between the judge and the
child, which precedes that waiver. Since these proceedings remain
confidential, little information exists about how trial judges assess a
child's capacity to understand and waive this right. Appellate cases
reveal little about the way trial judges evaluate the information they
receive.' 68 Because these hearings involve no lawyers in the first
place, appeals seldom occur. When they do, some appellate courts
seem wary of accepting a waiver of the right to counsel.169 Appellate
courts appear to require a more specific informed consent dialogue
than usually occurs when other rights are waived."70' Children, like
adults, may waive the right to counsel only if they do so knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily' with a "rational as well as factual un-
derstanding of the proceedings against [them].' 7 2 Despite this seem-
ingly rigorous standard, trial and appellate courts have accepted
waivers of the right to counsel from children as young as eleven, if
they are not physically or mentally impaired and if a parent is pres-
ent.173 Such acceptances have occurred even when the full scope of a
164. The right to counsel in juvenile proceedings is guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
165. See Feld, supra note 145, at 46.
166. See id at 244. Feld studied the rates of representation in New York, South
Dakota, Pennsylvania, California, and Minnesota. In urban areas, representation
reached as high as 95.9%. In the Midwest, it reached a low of 37.5%. See id. at 54-55.
167. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); see supra notes 145-50 and
accompanying text.
168. A broad based Westlaw search was conducted.
169. See, e.g., People v. Shawnn F., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Ct. App. 1995) (rec-
ognizing the differences in the potential inquiries a judge may make to a 15-year-old
and a 17-year-old).
170. See, e.g., K.M. v. State, 448 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (requir-
ing a thorough inquiry as to whether the juvenile waiver of counsel was made volunta-
rily and intelligently, and that it "be at least equal to that accorded an adult"); State
ex reL Jones, 372 So. 2d 779, 780 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that retarded 15-year-
old "lacked capacity to intelligently waive his right to counsel").
171. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
172. People v. Poplawski, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 760,766 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Dusky
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
173. Huff v. K.P., 302 N.W.2d 779, 282-83 (N.D. 1981).
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lawyer's duty and ability has not been explained to the child.174 More-
over, prior experience with the court may overcome educational defi-
ciencies and validate the waiver as long as a child is not retarded.175
Cases do exist where judges have brought to bear the full force of
cognitive development on the waiver decision. In upholding a child's
legal right to waive counsel, the Connecticut Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, noted the special problems that arise when assessing such
waivers:
[T]he validity of a child's waiver of counsel depends upon furnishing
the child full information not only about the child's own legal rights
but also about the .overall nature of the proceeding against him or
her. The need for broad-gauged advice is underscored by recent
empirical studies demonstrating that significant numbers of children
erroneously believe that lawyers are responsible for deciding issues
of guilt and punishment, that defense lawyers will not advocate the
interests of a juvenile who admits to the violation and that defense
lawyers have a duty to report to the court any evidence of the juve-
nile client's culpability. Only a full colloquy between the court and
the child can avoid such misperceptions and provide a solid basis for
the intelligent exercise or waiver of the right to counsel. Only a full
colloquy will permit the court to make an accurate determination of
whether a child who professes to wish to proceed pro se, without
counsel, has the developmental and cognitive ability to undertake a
realistic assessment of the consequences of such an action.176
In directing the trial court to conduct an informed consent dialogue
prior to accepting the waiver of counsel, the Connecticut Supreme
Court cited the work of Grisso, Piaget, and other cognitive develop-
ment researchers. 177 The court also noted the powerful influences
that parents exert on their children, and how those influences affect
waiver decisions.178 The court went on to reject the waiver in In re
Manuel R. because of undue parental influence, lack of inquiry into
capacity, the child's incomplete understanding of the charges, and an
absence of any discussion of the role of counsel.179 The appellate
court seemed to suggest that trial judges engage in an informed con-
sent dialogue in order to determine the validity of the waiver. The
court, however, did not discuss how the trial court should assess the
child's capacity during that inquiry.
The discussions between the judge and the child that precede a
waiver of counsel usually do not last longer than hearings to accept a
plea of guilty. Like all other hearings involving decision making by
children, they seldom last long enough for a judge to acquire the infor-
174. See id.
175. In re R.M., 252 A.2d 237, 240 (NJ. 1969).
176. In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 725 (Conn. 1988) (citation omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 725-26.
179. I at 726-27.
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mation necessary to render an honest and informed decision concern-
ing a child's cognitive ability to make the choice at hand.8 0
From a cognitive development standpoint, judicial decisions con-
cerning the validity of police interrogation present the most perplex-
ing cases. The judge exerts no control over the amount of information
the child possesses when that child makes the decision to knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to silence. That decision
takes place weeks or months before the court hearing, and in a police
station with no independent witnesses in attendance. The law re-
quires scant information be given to the child before she makes the
decision to waive rights. Miranda v. Arizona and subsequent cases
state that the police must do little more than repeat to the accused the
now familiar litany that-"he has the right to remain silent, that any-
thing lie says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires."''1 The waiver may be shown by nothing more than simple
assent.'82 The knowledge the judge gains comes through the testi-
mony of arguably biased witnesses; the child may not even testify. If
the child does testify, his testimony more likely reflects his later con-
versations with his lawyer rather than his knowledge at the time of the
event. As a result, children who testify often demonstrate more
knowledge about their rights, and more understanding of the conse-
quences of waiving them, than they possessed at the time the rights
were waived.
To evaluate the validity of the waiver, regardless of the child's age,
courts rely on the "totality of the circumstances" standard.1
8 3
Although some courts have rejected a simple balancing of factors as
leading to only "a cursory appraisal of the juvenile's position,"' 4 most
courts focus on the objective circumstances surrounding the interroga-
tion and attempt to balance their relative impacts. Courts consider:
(1) age of the accused;
(2) education of the accused;
180. See Feld, supra note 145, at 241-48 (criticizing the "totality of the circum-
stances" approach in cases concerning waivers of rights by minors).
181. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,479 (1966); see also Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988) (finding that Miranda warning was sufficient to inform peti-
tioner of his right to counsel).
182. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1979).
183. See In re Lucas F., 510 A.2d 270, 273-74 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (suggesting
that, albeit unlikely, even a waiver of rights by a 10-year-old may meet the criteria);
see also Commonwealth v. Philip S., 611 N.E.2d 226, 233 (Mass. 1993) (finding a
knowing and intelligent waiver of rights by a 12-year-old).
184. See, e.g., State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373, 377 (Me. 1982) (stating that "[t]he
simple balancing of factors can only lead to a cursory appraisal of the juvenile's posi-
tion thereby threatening the protection of his fundamental constitutional rights").
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(3) knowledge of the accused As to both the substance of the
charge, if any has been filed, and the nature of his rights to con-
sult with an attorney and remain silent;
(4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to con-
sult with relatives, friends or an attorney;
(5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal
charges had been filed;
(6) methods used in interrogation;
(7) length of interrogations;
(8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give state-
ments on prior occasions; and
(9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement
at a later date.18
5
As the Supreme Court of Maine noted in State v. Nicholas S.,' 8 6
when dealing with children, to focus on the above factors is inade-
quate to determine whether a child has the capacity to waive his
rights, or has done so knowingly and intelligently. This case and
others like it seem to be calling upon the police to engage in an in-
formed consent dialogue. Few police officers conduct such a dialogue,
and few courts require it.'87 The Connecticut Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, while calling for such a dialogue in cases involving waiver of
the right to counsel,ass rejects such an approach in cases involving Mi-
randa issues.'8 9 The United States Supreme Court stated in Patterson
v. Illinois'90 that the police need only inform an arrestee of his right to
an attorney, his right to remain silent, and the right of the government
to use his statements in order to fully inform him of his rights and
their consequences. 191 Police seldom do more. Waivers of the right to
silence often involve little more than the child's answer "yes" to the
police officer's question "do you understand these rights."' 9 2 At the
subsequent court hearing to assess the validity of that waiver, police
officers frequently relate that they read the Miranda warnings and
that the child agreed to talk. As previously noted, the child probably
will not testify at the hearing. The court receives no evidence of the
child's intellectual functioning. In the absence of such evidence,
courts apply a Miranda/PattersonlFare analysis and find that the child
185. West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1102 (1969).
186. See Nicholas S., 444 A.2d at 378 (stating that "[s]uch a focus in not inappropri-
ate; it is, in most instances, however, inadequate").
187. See State v. Perez, .591 A.2d 119, 125 (Conn. 1991) (citing cases such as State v.
Mattox, 550 P.2d 630, 633 (Ariz. 1976); People v. Prude, 363 N.E.2d 371, 373-74 (InI.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); State v. O'Connor, 346 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa 1984);
Edwards v. State, 608 P.2d 1006, 1011 (Kan. 1980); and State v. Manns, 329 S.E.2d
865, 870 (W. Va. 1985)).
188. In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 724-25 & n.6 (Conn. 1988).
189. State v. Perez, 591 A.2d at 124-25 & n.14.
190. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
191. Id. at 292-93.
192. See In re Robert 0., 439 N.Y.S.2d 994, 995-96 (Far. Ct. 1981).
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knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to silence.
Although defense attorneys sometimes call school counselors and psy-
chologists to testify at these hearings, their testimony often confuses
intellectual capacity with genuine understanding. 193 Further these
witnesses are never present when the waivers of rights actually occur.
Thus, a finding that the child exhibited cognitive competence at the
time of the waiver will not always guarantee that the child gave in-
formed consent. Moreover, since the evaluation of the child's knowl-
edge that is conducted by the counselors usually takes place between
the time of the confession and the time of the court hearing, previous
conversations between counsel and the child may likely affect the out-
come of the evaluation. Further, children who are capable of giving
informed consent at the time of the evaluation may not have been
competent at the time they waived their right. Nonetheless, properly
presented testimony by a psychologist may on occasion demonstrate
that a child does not have the capacity to waive the right to silence.194
While hearings concerning Miranda violations will last longer than
most other kinds of hearings concerning children's capacity, a consci-
entious judge will most likely know little more about the child than he
will know about children in other hearings. No informed consent dia-
logue takes place in the courtroom, the judge knows little about the
child, and he seldom speaks to the child himself. What the judge does
know, in most cases, relates to surface facts such as age, experience
with the judicial system, and grade in school. He may know the child's
IQ, but will probably not know what such a score means in the context
of the issues presented by the case. He will probably not receive in-
formation about the cognitive development of the child, or the child's
competence to waive the rights in question. Indeed, for the most part,
little that occurs at the hearing places a judge in a position to accu-
rately assess the existence of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of the right to silence.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ETHICAL JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS
OF CHILDREN'S DECISION-MAKING CAPACrrY
It seems clear that, despite a legal recognition of the importance
and relevance of social maturity and cognitive capacity in many differ-
ent kinds of cases involving children, trial judges gain very little infor-
mation about those concepts during a hearing, and spend very little
time considering them. Further, when judges determine that a child is
mature or intellectually capable of making decisions, the factors con-
193. See In re Owen F., 523 A.2d 627, 632-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); In re
Welfare of M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Minn. 1984).
194. In re Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Minn. 1979); Robert 0., 439
N.Y.S.2d at 1004. But see W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)(finding a waiver by a 10-year-old learning disabled child).
1996] 1903
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sidered in reaching those decisions frequently do not reflect the accu-
mulated research about child development.195
Arguably, if ethical decision making by judges means making deci-
sions based on the facts before them, on the developing law, and on
valid scientific principles (rather than on personal experiences, per-
sonal assessments about how things should be, or societal beliefs and
conventional wisdom), many observers could easily conclude that eth-
ical decision making in children's cases does not regularly occur. But
of course, nothing is quite so simple. As noted throughout part II of
this Article, judges must depend on lawyers to develop evidence in
these cases. If a lawyer fails to introduce evidence to show that the
child does or does not possess the intellectual capacity or psychosocial
stability to make decisions, a judge must rely simply on his or her
estimations of the social maturity and cognitive capacity gleaned from
the witness's demeanor or assessed from the child's answers to the
questions posed by the lawyers or the judge. The absence of testi-
mony by the child, or cross-examination of the child, further hampers
a judge's ability to make these assessments. When someone outside
the presence of the court assesses the child's maturity, understanding,
and capacity to make decisions, the judge's assessment of those con-
cepts will be accurate only if the testimony of the witnesses correctly
portray the circumstances of the assessment. The process is further
complicated if the witnesses conducting the assessment have a sub-
stantial interest in the outcome of the case. Moreover, replicating the
child's mental condition at the time an event occurred presents a
greater challenge than simply replicating the circumstances of the
event itself.
Even if courts began to demand that better evidence be presented
at the hearings, the process might not change and the results might not
differ. The law places the burden of persuasion in civil cases on the
plaintiff. If plaintiffs produce insufficient evidence to prove their case,
they lose. In children's cases, however, the law does not clearly assign
the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff. For example, in various
kinds of child custody cases-where courts make determinations by
applying the best interest of the child standard-both claimants have
the burden of persuasion. In addition, when a child seeks an abortion,
a demand for more proof than the petitioner presents often proves
counter-productive if doing so would only reinforce an otherwise ob-
vious determination. This result is especially true if no other party in
the proceeding demands better proof. Furthermore, in disputes con-
cerning Miranda issues, the government has the burden of persuasion,
but the child possesses the information that the court needs. If the
child does not present such information, and if evidentiary and consti-
tutional privileges prevent the government from obtaining it, the pros-
195. In re Manual R. 543 A.2d 719, 725 (Conn. 1988).
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ecutor would have great difficulty in ever meeting the burden. Such
an outcome exacts a great societal cost.
If courts required litigants to prove capacity, maturity, and under-
standing, the cost of litigation would substantially increase and justice
could be delayed. Ascertaining cognitive competence involves a sin-
gularly complex process. Individual testing and assessments would be
necessary. Even if the assessments took place, however, the current
forum for making these determinations might not be the most suita-
ble. To establish that the child made a choice with informed consent,
many potentially long conversations between the child, the interested
parties, and perhaps neutral parties might have to occur. While costs
should not deprive a litigant of justice, many litigants could not afford
these activities. Further, even if these intensified evaluations took
place, the final outcomes in some cases might not differ significantly
from those occurring now.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, judges need to reach decisions in
an ethical manner. Failure to do so may cause harm and result in
injustice. Even if the current truncated procedures achieve a suffi-
cient semblance of justice in most cases, errors will occur unless courts
implement and follow a coherent system of ethical decision making.
For example, rejecting a child's preference in a custody case may not
cause a child harm, but may constitute an assault on the personal au-
tonomy of a mature competent adolescent. Moreover, orders that re-
ject a child's preference may prove to be unenforceable. Additionally,
an adolescent may not be physically harmed if the court requires pa-
rental consent or notification before an abortion is performed. Such
parental involvement may, however, cause psychological harm and re-
sults in an overwhelming intrusion into a cognitively competent child's
personal autonomy, especially if the judge bases the decision on per-
sonal beliefs. Moreover, the decision might result in a back room
abortion. Other kinds of health care decisions raise similar autonomy
and enforceability issues. Finally, the long-term physical, psychologi-
cal, and social damage that may follow from erroneous determinations
of waivers of right in delinquency cases are too great to be calculated.
For judicial decisions to be correct and ethically reached, the proce-
dure in each kind of case discussed in part II requires adjustments.
The decision making in all kinds of cases require that judges be aware
of scientific research concerning children's development, and rely on
this research appropriately in the hearings. To advocate that judges
use this information, however, raises questions of evidentiary law and
fairness to litigants. If the parties do not introduce the evidence, how
does the information become part of the process? Two possible ways
exist. First, information may become part of the hearing through the
formal process of judicial notice. Courts may take judicial notice of
information that is common knowledge or capable of certain verifica-
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tion. 96 Although greater agreement exists concerning judicial notice
of facts arising out of the physical sciences, courts may also take judi-
cial notice of social science facts. 9 7 As noted throughout this Article,
some general agreement about child development exists. For exam-
ple, few people believe that very young children think rationally, and
most researchers believe the Piagetian stage theory, with some refine-
ment in the case of adolescents, to be generally valid. Thus, a judge
who needs to make findings concerning a child's cognitive capacity
may formally take judicial notice of some aspects of the scientific re-
search developed by cognitive theorists. Appellate courts have actu-
ally done so.
More importantly, however, all legal fact-finders rely on informa-
tion that is not formally part of the record. Indeed, the analysis of the
cases in part II, not surprisingly, suggests that judges currently are re-
lying on some theory of child development when they make decisions.
All fact-finders bring to bear life's experiences on the evidence they
hear and the decisions they make. That is what drawing inferences
from the evidence is all about. As Professor Thayer said about 100
years ago:
In conducting a process of judicial reasoning, as of other reasoning,
not a step can be taken without assuming something which has not
been proved; and the capacity to do this, with competent judgment
and efficiency, is imputed to judges and juries as part of their neces-
sary mental outfit.198
Unfortunately, much current judicial reasoning with regard to child
development too frequently relies on folk tales or the judge's personal
experiences, rather than on more verifiable theory. 199 Such decision
making constitutes unethical judicial practice.
If statutes or court rules required judges to develop some expertise
about children before they begin to decide cases,2°° then the decision
making in the types of cases discussed in part II might occur differ-
ently. Serious initial and in-service training should be required of all
judges assigned to hear children's cases. In each case, the judge
should be required to give the litigants notice that the weight accorded
196. McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 329-30 (Edward W. Cleary
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1972); Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial
Notice of Social Facts: Parham as An Example, 22 J. Fain. L. 633, 634 n.7 (1983-84).
197. 1 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein's Evidence, 200[06] (1995); Perry &
Melton, supra note 196, at 639-40.
198. Weinstein, supra note 197, 200[01] n.14 (quoting Thayer, A Preliminary
Treatise On Evidence at Common Law 279-80 (1898)); see also Perry & Melton, supra
note 196, at 642-43 (discussing evidentiary cases concerning experts).
199. See Perry & Melton, supra note 196, at 647-60 (providing a critique of the
scientific assumptions used by the Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979)).
200. See D.C. Code Ann. § 11-908 (1981) (presupposing special qualifications for
judges in the District of Columbia court of general jurisdiction who are assigned to
the Family Division). Unfortunately, this presupposition has almost no validity.
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to children's preferences and decisions will reflect an understanding of
the latest findings of child development researchers. Thus, the court
should assume that, in the absence of specific evidence to the con-
trary, children below the age of ten are incapable of rational thought
as that term is understood by child development specialists. 201 The
court should further assume that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, children above the age of fourteen-who possess accurate
information and are not subject to undue pressure-have the ability
to make decisions as well as adults. In between the ages of ten and
fourteen, however, the courts should make no assumptions because of
the fluidity of cognitive growth. Those seeking to present evidence of
a child's preference or waiver of right should be required to demon-
strate cognitive capability when the child is between ten and fourteen
years old. In such cases, the parties would be permitted to present
evidence to prove or disprove cognitive competency.
With respect to the quality of the decision as opposed to the cogni-
tive capacity to make it, the court should require an informed consent
dialogue before accepting the child's preference or waiver as valid.
Thus, evidence would have to be presented to show that the child was
fully informed of the nature of the activity involved as well as the
risks, discomforts, benefits, and alternatives to the choice. Because
children may view risk differently from adults and may have different
temporal perspectives, the information provided to them should ac-
count for these variables. The choice itself would have to be volun-
tary; a coerced choice should be rejected. A court should not accept
an acquiescent or deferent response to authority-be it peer, parental,
or official-unless the child received counseling about the right to re-
ject such influence.202 If the child reached such a preference or waiver
of right in this fashion, it would prevail in the absence of some serious
countervailing societal interest.
In all cases involving child custody, judges should give no weight to
preferences stated by children under ten.20 3 Because children under
ten have not developed to the point where they can likely engage in
rational decision making, courts need not give weight to their prefer-
ence. Although weight should not be given to the preferences of these
young children, "Many young children exhibit extraordinary moments
201. Using the age often reflects the studies of Piaget, Ambuel and Rappaport,
Lewis, Wertheim and Campbell, Belter and Grisso, and others. See supra part I.
202. Grisso & Vierling, supra note 110, at 421 (discussing psychological definition
of voluntary consent).
203. The Standards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in Custody and Visitation
Proceedings, published in 1995 by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
presume competence at the age of 12 because judges begin to accord deference to
children's choices at that age. See American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Rep-
resenting Children: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in Custody or
Visitation Proceedings 2 (1995).
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of wisdom."2" Further, everyone's personal autonomy-regardless
of their age-should be recognized and respected. Thus, children
choosing to state a preference for a custodial parent should be heard.
On the other hand, because custody issues may be very disturbing for
young children,2 °5 courts should not encourage litigants to present
such testimony.
When a child fourteen years of age or older states a preference,
courts should accept it as controlling if the preference is expressed
after an informed consent dialogue takes place.20 6 If judges conduct
the dialogue themselves, it must take longer than the fifteen minutes
that most judicial interviews with a child currently take. Given the
nature of child custody hearings, however, judges probably will never
know enough about the family's dynamics, or be able to take enough
time during the hearing to ensure that the child's choice reflects full
knowledge of the risks and benefits of the alternatives, and is not
merely an acquiescence to peer or parental influences. For the prefer-
ence to be determinative, third parties-either professionals or close
but neutral friends-should conduct the dialogue insuring that the
child understands the risks, benefits, and alternatives, and is not sub-
ject to overwhelming outside influences. The judge's role should be to
ensure that a complete dialogue occurred.207 The court should disre-
gard the fact that a child chooses the parent that the judge would re-ject, unless evidence exists showing a clear physical or psychological
danger to the child from that parent. Litigants who seek to introduce
evidence of the preference of a child-between the ages of ten and four-
teen, would have to engage a professional to assess the child's cogni-
tive capacity. If the expert determined the child to be cognitively
competent to make the choice, then an informed consent dialogue
would have to occur. If the evidence showed that a cognitively com-
petent child between the ages of ten and fourteen made the choice
with full information and without undue influence, the court would be
bound by the decision in the absence of evidence of harm.
Letting cognitively competent, well-informed children choose their
custodial parent does not contravene the best interest standard. Let-
204. Len Doyal & Paul Henning, Stopping Treatment For End-Stage Renal Failure:
The Rights of Children and Adolescents, 8 Pediatric Nephrology 768, 769 (1994).
205. See Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 87, at 28-30 (discussing various traumatic
situations faced by children in custody disputes).
206. Of course, there is no reason to require children at any age to choose. Divorce
is a traumatic event for most children. As a result, they should not be forced to make
a choice or even be encouraged to do so.
207. An informed consent dialogue conducted with an adolescent who is familiar
with divorce and who can reason about alternatives has been found to produce sound
results. Gerald P. Koocher, Children Under the Law: The Paradigm of Consent, in
Reforming The Law: Impact of Child Development Research 3, 21-23 (Gary B. Mel-
ton ed., 1987) (citing E.F. Greenberg & J. Rappaport, Predictors Of Children's Com-




ting children decide does not present a danger. Most parents involved
in custody cases are presumably fit parents, who have raised the chil-
dren for years without official involvement. Further, scant evidence
supports the view that the judge's choice is any better. We presume
cognitively competent people to be best able to determine their own
interests. We make this assumption because a person usually knows
more about his own interests than any third party. We also presume
that cognitively competent children can make equally or more difficult
decisions, such as those associated with pregnancy. Moreover, most
divorcing parents decide custody issues on their own, and most courts
now encourage them to do so. Anecdotal evidence suggests that an
adolescent's preference often controls the custody arrangement. Fi-
nally, as most judges realize, a child ordered to live with a parent they
reject will consider it an affront to their personal autonomy, which
often leads to disobedience of that order. Such disobedience of the
order will only spur new rounds of litigation.
The same guidelines should apply in the delinquency context.208
Pleas of guilty, waivers of counsel, and waivers of rights preceding
police interrogations by children under ten should not be deemed
valid. Such waivers by those fourteen and over should be preceded by
an informed consent dialogue. Waivers of rights by children between
ten and fourteen should only be deemed valid if the evidence shows
that the child is cognitively competent and that an informed consent
dialogue has preceded the waiver. Such a standard does not conflict
with the totality of the circumstances standard. It merely insures that
litigants address the most significant factor in the totality equation.
Judges would conduct the dialogue in proceedings to enter a plea of
guilty. The inquiry would resemble that used by courts which follow
the Boykin-Rule 11 procedure. 20 9 Nonetheless, such a dialogue would
have to be more detailed to insure that the child entered the plea with
a full understanding of the risks and benefits of not maintaining inno-
cence. Ritual-like conversations would have no place in the court-
room. At a hearing to enter a plea of guilty, the court would have to
take the time to insure that the child understood the nature of each
right relating to trial and the consequences, risks, and benefits of giv-
ing them up. The court would also have to insure that neither parent
nor lawyer was controlling the decision.
The dialogue concerning a waiver of the right to counsel would also
be conducted by the court, and would resemble the dialogue concern-
ing a plea of guilty. The dialogue, however, would have to be very
208. While the same guidelines would apply, it is likely that there would be more
challenges to the children's cognitive capacity since so many children who come
before the court charged with crimes have lower IQs and educational and
psychosocial deficiencies, all of which correlate to lower levels of cognitive
functioning.
209. See supra notes 151, 156.
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extensive. Explaining all of the benefits and risks,210 at every stage of
the proceeding, of waiving counsel would take a great deal of time.
Further, the judge is, to some extent, an interested party in the deci-
sion to waive counsel. Young people often acquiesce in the face of
judicial authority. A judge may send subtle but powerful clues about
his preferences for the child during this inquiry.21' Thus, the judge
would have to take great care to maintain his neutrality in the
decision.
Police officers would have to alter the way they inform children of
their rights before questioning begins. As Grisso points out, children
who are merely told their rights as prescribed by Miranda do not fully
understand them even when they have the capacity to do so. 212 Sim-
ply reading the warnings will not give a child enough information
about the nature of the rights or about the risks, benefits, and conse-
quences of waiving them. Police officers must necessarily elaborate.
Further, the conditions under which the rights are waived constitute
inherently coercive circumstances. Police do not engage in an in-
formed consent dialogue. The manner in which police obtain waivers
from children would not suffice in a medical situation. Currently, po-
lice officers seek to obtain confessions, not to warn people of the rea-
sons why speaking to them may be disadvantageous. Although
seeking confessions at all costs may be an acceptable societal goal,
courts have rejected this stance. 3 The Supreme Court has not over-
ruled Miranda even though their enunciated standard can be used to
justify a less than ideal inquiry.
Trial judges do not always implement the full scope of the Miranda
doctrine in children's cases. The impulses of the court in delinquency
cases differ from those in custody cases, medical cases, or even abor-
tion cases. The United States shows little sympathy towards law
breakers; therefore, courts do not invoke the best interest standard to
keep a delinquent out of the court-even if it may be in his best inter-
est.2 14 Not surprisingly, in light of societal outrage about crime, courts
210. It is hard to imagine any benefits of waiving the right to counsel. But see Feld,
supra note 145, at 73, 245 (stating that uncounseled children often receive lesser sanc-
tions from the court than do those that have counsel).
211. See In re Maricopa County, 594 P.2d at 556 (discussing of the proper way to
conduct hearings concerning waivers of the right to counsel by children and citing
In re Beasley, 362 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978); In re
Rondald E., 562 P.2d 684 (Cal. 1977); In re Michael M., 96 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Ct. App.
1970)).
212. Grisso, supra note 45, at 1137, 1143.
213. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (finding that a suspect has the right
against self-incrimination in an interrogation). The Miranda Court also stated that
"our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government.. . produce
the evidence against [the defendant] by its own independent labors, rather than by the
cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his mouth." Id. at 460 (citing Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940)).
214. When the child's best interest and crime control clash, crime control usually
prevails. See Holland & Miyniec, supra note 3, at 19.
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find most confessions to be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
made, and use them against children. Surprisingly, however, these re-
suits can occur when cognitive research suggests such findings to be
insupportable. Grisso's studies have shown that children younger
than fifteen years of age seldom understand and protect their rights. 15
He measured children's ability to comprehend the words and phrases
used in waiving statements as well as their ability to comprehend the
function and significance of the rights conveyed in the statements. 16
He found that eighty percent of children under fifteen years of age
could not understand either the words of the warnings or the functions
of the rights. While sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds can understand
individual words of the Miranda warning as well as adults, comparable
adult levels of understanding of the underlying rights were found lack-
ing.2 17 Additionally, older adolescents with IQs under eighty could
not understand their rights at all.
Although the police would resist implementing an informed consent
dialogue in a waiver of rights situation, courts should insist upon it in
order to make ethical decisions. Indeed, some courts have taken this
step.218 All courts should take this similar step because to take waiv-
ers of rights from children (who are cognitively incapable of under-
standing what they are doing) and use such waivers to convict children
for crimes does not speak well of a society. Our zeal to convict chil-
dren should not overwhelm our need to treat them as children. On a
daily basis, we reject the choices that cognitively incompetent children
make concerning all sorts of activities. Yet, with respect to choices of
immeasurable and lasting import made in delinquency cases, judges
let cognitively incompetent children choose. Such inconsistencies,
even in the face of growing societal concerns regarding crime, do not
constitute an ethical practice.
Requiring that cognitive competency be proved will require some
changes in hearing procedures. Competency assessments by qualified
professionals will become more frequent. Prosecutors will have to be
given access to children below the age of fourteen and to older chil-
dren who raise cognitive incapacity because they will have the burden
to prove the validity of the waiver. This can be accomplished similarly
to the way they gain access to defendants pleading insanity. Profes-
215. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Consent in Delinquency Proceedings, in Children's
Competence to Consent 131, 138-40 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983); see also Belter
& Grisso, supra note 45, at 907-08; Grisso, supra note 45, at 1143, 1151-52, 1164-65.
216. Grisso, supra note 45, at 1143-49; see also A. Bruce Furguson & Alan C.
Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 San Diego L. Rev. 39, 40-42, 54 (1970) (reach-
ing the same results).
217. See In re R.W., 279 A.2d 709, 713 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (acknowl-
edging that even adult lay people are not equipped to understand or waive the rights).
218. See Maine v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373, 378 (Me. 1982) ("The totality-of-the-
circumstances approach requires a broader evaluation of the circumstances surround-
ing a confession than examination of only the words spoken and actions taken by the
parties during the actual period of questioning.").
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sionals associated either with the prosecutor or with the court itself
can provide assessments. Statements concerning the crime itself
would be excluded from the trial. Since children over the age of four-
teen commit the bulk of juvenile crime, competency would not be an
issue in most cases. Nonetheless, police officers would have to con-
duct an informed consent dialogue to insure that the child truly knew
and rationally processed the information. Finally, the police would
have to refrain from using the subtle coercive tactics they now use for
obtaining waivers of rights.
The same rules should apply in abortion cases. Lawyers for chil-
dren and pregnancy counseling centers would have to be put on notice
that, except for rare cases, a child under ten could not obtain an abor-
tion without parental consent or notification unless it was in her best
interest.219 Additionally, in all cases involving children under the age
of fourteen who come to the court with a petition to dispense with
parental notification or consent, evidence of cognitive capacity would
have to be established and evidence of an informed consent dialogue
would have to be presented unless the petitioner was relying on the
best interest test. Despite the presence of time constraints in these
cases, the need for additional evidence should not create too great an
additional burden. Pregnancy counselors should be providing chil-
dren with complete information prior to the abortion procedure in
any event. These dialogues should spell out the risks and benefits of
abortion and the alternatives to it. When properly conducted, the dia-
logues also provide a check on undue influences from peers, and take
into account emotional reactions that might be clouding rational deci-
sion making. Providing the additional assessment of cognitive capac-
ity might require counseling centers to have agreements with
development specialists to perform such evaluations on an expedited
basis. While such requirements do place additional burdens on peti-
tioners, refusing to require them places a judge in the position of mak-
ing a legally required finding without sufficient evidence to support it.
Such decision making is unethical.
Health and treatment decisions should also be subject to the same
guidelines. Informed consent dialogues take place now as a matter of
course when families contemplate organ donations or surgery, and
when doctors propose risky or painful life prolonging therapies. In
most cases today, children and parents come to the same conclusions
about medical treatment and donation, and doctors accede to these
wishes. When the parent and child disagree, or the child and parent
disagree with the doctors, adding the burden of proving the cognitive
capacity of children under fourteen will not add to the burden of the
petitioners.
219. The Bellotti test requires courts to find either that the child is mature or that
the abortion is in her best interest. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979).
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The possibility of death that arises when children refuse to accept
life saving interventions complicates resolution of health care dis-
putes. Accepting the mature minor standard in health care matters
permits cognitively capable children to choose death as well as to
choose life saving therapies or procedures. Older reported cases usu-
ally involved blood transfusions, a rather benign but religiously objec-
tionable medical procedure incidental to other nonobjectionable
medical procedures. Today, modem medicine that may help a child
live may also cause intense and unbearable pain and may kill or at
least not save the child. Similarly, modem medical science enables
children to participate in altruistic medical procedures that may en-
danger the child's own life.
The American Academy of Pediatrics and the Midwest Bioethics
Center of Kansas City, Missouri have published formal statements en-
dorsing the right of all persons except those with diminished decision-
making capacity to refuse medical interventions. 20 The principle au-
thor of the statements, Dr. William Bartholeme, says that under the
guidelines "if a person is 15, 16, or 17 and knows what is wrong with
them and understand [sic] the options, risks and benefits of treatment,
they would have the same right of refusal an adult would have."'221
Others disagree. For example, Dr. Keith Ashcraft, a pediatric surgeon
in Kansas City, says children "in an acute situation, particularly a
teenager... very frequently will make the wrong decision.... Chil-
dren can't realize the pain-for-gain concept, and to spend your time
trying to convince them.., seems to be stretching the point to the
ridiculous." 2 1
The 1rospect of a judge forcing a child to undergo a medical proce-
dure seems offensive. As Leonard Glantz, a Boston University pro-
fessor of health law, asks in relation to a sixteen-year-old who refuses
chemotherapy: "What would [doctors] be asking the court for? The
authority to tie him down?" 23 George Annas, a colleague of Glantz'
adds: "There[ ] [i]s absolutely no point in going to court on this....
What you do is talk to the kid and just keep talking to him. You've
got a much better chance of persuading him than persuading a
judge." 4 Although such persuasion may work with children who re-
sist treatment because of the pain, such an approach clearly does not
have the desired effect when the child resists the treatment because of
deeply held religious convictions.
Given the disagreements within the medical profession and given
hospitals' needs to avoid liability either for treating without consent or
220. Perkins, supra note 123, at *3.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Richard A. Knox, Billy Best's Case Reveals Gray Area of Patient Rights, Bos-




for withholding treatment, these cases will continue to come before
courts. I believe that ethical decision making also requires that courts
understand the limits imposed upon the government in a democracy
and to recognize the limits of their own power. Courts exist to resolve
disputes between people, but their ultimate enforcement power in-
volves either financial or punitive measures. Money will not solve
these problems. Judges can use their punitive power and, with the
help of the police, order that people be seized, tied down to a gurney,
drugged into unconsciousness, and then treated. Such authoritarian
action towards one who seeks no harm to others has no place in a
democracy. While mature children may not have the political auton-
omy that an adult possesses, they still possess the personal autonomy
possessed by all human beings. The specter of a judge ordering such a
drastic intrusion into the personal autonomy of a cognitively compe-
tent, socially mature, informed adolescent, who for religious or per-
sonal reasons chooses to reject treatment, ultimately repulses most
individuals. Power has its limits. Our society has recognized those
limits when adults are concerned. While the result in children's cases
is not altogether satisfying, the alternatives are worse. As the Illinois
Supreme court has decided, there seems to be no principled reason to
reject such limits on state power when cognitively competent, well in-
formed adolescents are concerned." 5 The hearings would resemble
those conducted in Illinois and in Santa Clara County. Testimony
would have to be introduced to show the cognitive competency of the
child as well as the nature of the informed consent dialogue that pre-
ceded the decision. Cognitively competent children who were fully
informed and reached the decision voluntarily would have their
wishes respected.
CONCLUSION
When legislatures do not give children an unfettered right to make
a decision that affects their lives, courts are often called upon to make
those decisions. Judicial opinions and conversations with trial judges
provide some understanding of how judges decide cases involving chil-
dren's preferences and choices. This information suggests that judges
do not make systematic use of child development theory when consid-
ering the cognitive capacity and social maturity of children. The infor-
mation also indicates that when judges do enforce a child's choice with
respect to a course of action, they do not insure that the child made
the choice with full knowledge of the alternatives, risks, and benefits
of their choice, or that the child made the choice without undue peer,
parental, or official influence. Their failure to systematically inquire
into the nature of the choice and the reason for it calls into question
225. See supra notes 123, 138 and accompanying text.
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the validity and the ethics of judicial decisions concerning children's
choices in a variety of cases.
Research into child development and into children's decision-mak-
ing capacity suggests that the wishes of most children under ten should
be rejected since they do not engage in truly rational thought. It also
reveals that the wishes of children above the age of fourteen should
control a court's rulings if the child makes the choices after engaging
in an informed consent dialogue. Such a dialogue should fully explain
the nature of the preferred alternative, including its risks, benefits,
and consequences, and the alternatives to it. It also should help the
court ascertain whether the child made the choice without undue pa-
rental, peer, or official influence. Finally, the research also indicates
that children between the ages of ten and fourteen should be treated
like those above the age of fourteen if their representatives present
evidence of cognitive capacity and informed consent.
While adopting these standards would alter the structure of some
court hearings, the changes would not be burdensome and the costs
involved would not be prohibitive. Consistency when considering
these issues would insure that courts do not compromise the personal
autonomy of cognitively competent adolescents. This model would
also provide a more principled method of decision making by judges.
While this paradigm would give adolescents more power to control
decisions than they currently possess, no reason exists to believe that
their choices would be less informed or worse than those currently
imposed upon them.
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